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Abstract. Two-party communication protocols for public-key cryptosystems are studied. The 
formal models are based on the definitions given by Dolev and Yao [6]. While the main concern 
of Dolev and Yao was security, the subject of the present paper is the 'verifiability' of protocols. 
If a protocol is both sender-verifiable and receiver-verifiable, then either participant can detect 
when a false or altered message has been injected into the system and can refuse to respond to 
such a message. Hence, the power of a saboteur can be severely limited if at each stage the 
participants refuse to continue the exchange unless the last message received complies with the 
protocol. This means that the message authentication problem of Diflie and Hellman [4] can be 
solved. 
To formally describe the notion of verifiability, 'sender-verification sequences' and 'receiver- 
verification sequences' are introduced; if a protocol has a strong sender-verification (receiver- 
verification) sequence, then there is a simple algorithm that the sender (resp., receiver) can use 
to determine at each stage whether the last message received complies with the protocol. The 
main results are characterization theorems for both symmetric cascade protocols and symmetric 
name-stamp protocols that have strong sender-verification sequences or strong receiver-verifcafion 
sequences. In addition, characterization theorems for nonsymmetric cascade protocols and non- 
symmetric name-stamp protocols that have verification sequences that are not necessarily strong 
are developed. 
1. Introduction 
Public key encryption as used in network communication has been investigated 
extensively. The main advantage of the techniques developed in this area is the 
potential for secure communication. However, while public key systems are often 
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effective in preventing a passive saboteur from deciphering an intercepted message, 
protocols must be designed to be secure when dealing with saboteurs who can 
impersonate users or send copies of intercepted messages on the public channel. 
Dolev and Yao [6] have shown how informal arguments about protocols can lead 
to erroneous conclusions, and they have developed formal models of two-party 
protocols, both cascade protocols and name-stamp protocols. Recall that a protocol 
is a set of rules that specify what operators a pair of users, the sender and the 
receiver, need to apply in an exchange of messages for the purpose of transmitting 
a given plaintext message from the sender to the receiver. In terms of their models, 
Dolce and Yao developed an elegant characterization f cascade protocols that are 
secure, a characterization with conditions that can be checked by inspection. On 
the other hand, Book and Otto [3] have shown that no such characterization can 
exist for name-stamp protocols that are secure and thus that only algorithmic methods 
(as in [5] or [7]) are available for determining whether a name-stamp protocol is 
secure. 
The subject of the present paper is the 'verifiability' of two-party protocols. A 
protocol is sender-verifiable if the sender is able to verify that the reply messages 
transmitted by the receiver comply with the rules of the protocol based on the 
plaintext message that the sender transmitted in the first stage of the exchange. 
Similarly, a protocol is receiver-verifiable if the receiver is able to verify that the 
reply messages that he receives from the sender comply with the rules of the protocol 
based on the first message that the sender transmits. If a protocol is both sender- 
verifiable and receiver-verifiable, then the message authentication problem as stated 
by Diffie and Hellman [4] can be solved by requiring that neither participant respond 
at any stage beyond the first exchange until he has established that the messages 
received so far comply with the protocol; if the message does not comply with the 
protocol, then the message is not authentic, that is, the injection into the system of 
false or altered messages can be detected. 
The notion of verifiability also can be used to modify the notion of security. Dolev 
and Yao described in detail how a cunning saboteur can induce the sender or the 
receiver or both to transmit information that will allow the saboteur to read the 
plaintext message transmitted inan exchange. In each case the power of the saboteur 
depends on the sender or receiver applying the operators pecified in the protocol 
to an arbitrary message sent by the saboteur without checking that the message 
complies with the messages previously transmitted in the exchange. We show here 
that if the protocol is both sender-verifiable and receiver-verifiable, then the power 
of the saboteur is severely limited if the following condition is satisfied: at each 
stage the participants refuse to continue the exchange unless the last message r ceived 
complies with the protocol. 
The notion of verifying that the last message received complies with the previous 
messages needs to be made formal and, more importantly, needs to be formalized 
in such a way that there is an algorithm to carry out this task. To accomplish this 
we introduce the notion of 'strong sender-verification sequences' and 'strong receiver- 
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verification sequences'. We show that the existence of such sequences provides the 
power for the sender (in the first case) and the receiver (in the second case) to verify 
that the messages received actually comply with the protocol. 
While Dolev and Yao considered only two types of protocols, cascade and 
name-stamp, we introduce another parameter which yields four types of protocols. 
The protocols of Dolev and Yao are 'symmetric' in the sense that for every user X, 
not only does the composition of the decryption function of X with the encryption 
function of X yield the identity function but also the composition of the encryption 
function of X with the decryption function of X yields the identity function. Here 
we introduce 'nonsymmetric' protocols in which the latter composition is not  the 
identity function, that is, the composition of the encryption function of X with the 
decryption function of X does not yield the identity. After reviewing the basic 
notion of security in protocols, we develop in Section 3 a characterization f secure 
two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols that is similar to the characterization f 
secure two-party symmetric cascade protocols developed by Dolev and Yao. 
Section 4 is devoted to the notion of verifiability. The formal definitions of 
verification sequences are developed there as well as the arguments showing the 
usefulness of these notions. In Section 5 we establish a characterization theorem 
for two-party symmetric cascade protocols that have both strong sender-verification 
sequences and strong receiver-verification sequences; the conditions in this charac- 
terization theorem can be checked by inspection. In addition, we derive characteriz- 
ation theorems for two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols that have both sender- 
verification sequences and receiver-verification sequences; unfortunately, we do not 
have such characterizations for protocols of this type that have strong verification 
sequences, but we discuss the modifications that are necessary. 
In Section 6 we consider nonsymmetric name-stamp protocols. Again we provide 
characterization theorems for protocols of this type that have sender-verification 
sequences or receiver-verification sequences but not for those protocols with strong 
verification sequences. In Section 7 we turn to symmetric name-stamp protocols 
and provide characterization theorems for those protocols of this type with strong 
sender-verification sequences or strong receiver-verification sequences. 
The semantics of these types of protocols are best described by considering certain 
string-rewriting systems uch as Thue systems with the Church-Rosser property. 
However, only the most basic results about such systems appear to be useful here. 
Unfortunately, the only proofs we have for our characterization theorems involve 
'brute-force' combinatorics on words.: 
There are two questions that arise naturally in this context that are left unanswered. 
Assume that the protocol is both sender-verifiable and receiver-verifiable and that 
at each stage the participants refuse to continue the exchange unless the last message 
received complies with the protocol. First, can one obtain a complete characterization 
of the power of a saboteur just as Dolev and Yao did for symmetric ascade and 
symmetric name-stamp protocols? We conjecture that the answer is 'yes' but we 
leave this problem for the reader. Second, for each type of protocol considered 
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here, can one obtain a characterization of secure protocols based on the above 
assumption? We believe that an affirmative answer is unlikely and suggest that the 
methods used by the authors in [3] may be useful in this context. 
For the most part this paper is self-contained; in particular, the detailed efinitions 
of the syntax and the semantics of protocols are developed in Section 2. What is 
lacking is the motivation for the definitions of the formal models and for the 
underlying assumptions. For this motivation the reader should see the paper by 
Dolev and Yao [6]. 
2. Definitions and models of protocols 
Dolev and Yao [6] have developed formal models for protocols. Here we are 
interested in their models and their results on the security of such protocols. In this 
section we review the definitions from [6], and we develop the algebraic syntax of 
these models in terms of monoids and rewriting systems. 
Recall the basic definitions of public-key encryption systems. Every user X has 
an encryption function Ex and a decryption function Dx. The functions map A* to 
A*, where A is some finite set of symbols and A* is the set of all finite words over 
A, and so composition of functions is well-defined. A public directory contains all 
pairs (X, Ex) and is available to all users, but the decryption function Dx is known 
only to user X. Let E = {ExiX is a user} and D = {DxIX is a user}. 
In addition to encryption and decryption functions, 'name-stamp' rotocols have 
'name-appending' and 'name-matching' functions. Assume that the names of the 
users can be encoded as strings in A* that have length m for some fixed m > 0. For 
any w • a* ,  if Iwl I> m, then write w = head(w)tail(w) where Itail(w)[ = m. For each 
user X there are two functions: 
(a) the name-appending functions ix, where, for every w ~ A*, ix(w)= wX (we 
use X for the code of X); 
(b) the name-matching function dx where, for every w e A*, 
~head(w) 
dx (w) = [undefined 
if tail(w) = X, 
otherwise. 
In addition, every user has the deletion function d where for every w • A*, 
d(w) ~head(w) 
= [undefined 
iflwl I> m, 
otherwise. 
Let I -{ ix IX  is a user}, J={dx[X is a user}, and F=DuEuIu Ju{d}.  For 
each 7e F and we F*, let [wlv denote the number of occurrences of 3' in w. 
An assumption that is usually made is that for all users X and messages M, 
knowing Ex(M), the public directory does not reveal anything about M. This 
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assumption is somewhat vague as a mathematical statement, and so we will interpret 
this to mean that for each user X, the function Dx is not a composition of functions 
in F-  {Dx}. 
Another assumption is that for every pair of distinct users X, Y, 
{Dx, Ex, Dy, Ey, ix, dx, iy, dg, d} is a set of nine distinct functions. 
We will consider four types of protocols. If only encryption and decryption 
functions are allowed, then the protocols are called 'cascade', while if the name- 
appending and name-matching functions are also allowed, then the protocols are 
called 'name-stamp'. Each of these classes of protocols is subdivided into two types: 
'symmetric' and 'nonsymmetric'. 
By definition of 'decryption', for each user X, the composition of the decryption 
function Dx and the encryption function Ex is the identity, i.e. DxEx = 1. The 
assumption of symmetry is that for each user X, the composition of the encryption 
function Ex and the decryption function Dx is also the identity, ExDx = 1. In a 
nonsymmetric protocol, for each user X, the composition of the encryption function 
Ex with the decryption function Dx is not the identity, i.e. ExDx ~ 1. 
The sets of relations 
(1) for every user X, DxEx = 1, and 
(2) for every user X, ExDx = 1, 
are called 'cancellation rules'. Other examples of cancellation rules are those used 
in name-stamp protocols: 
(3) for every user X, dxix = 1, and 
(4) for every user X, dix = 1. 
It should be noted that in any name-stamp protocol, either symmetric or nonsym- 
metric, the composition of a name-appending function ix with the corresponding 
name-matching function dx or with the deletion function d is not the identity. 
Since A* is the domain and co-domain of every function in F, arbitrary composi- 
tions of functions from F are well-defined. Another important assumption is that 
there is no relation on the composition of functions from F except hose that result 
from application of the cancellation rules plus the normal associativity of composi- 
tion and the properties of the identity function. 
To study arbitrary compositions of functions from F and the effect of applying 
an arbitrary set T of cancellation rules on F, we consider ewriting systems on 
strings; more specifically, we consider 'Thue systems'. 
Let .Y be a set of distinct symbols. Let ~7" be the set of all finite strings over ~7 
with empty word ` 1; let ?+=?* -{`1} .  If a, fl E?*,  then the concatenation of a 
and/3 is denoted by a/3. Since concatenation is associative, .Y* is the free monoid 
generated by .Y. The length of a string 3' is denoted by 13'1: ['11=0; lal = 1 if a e.,Y; 
I ya l=[y l+ l  if ye.Y*, ae.Y. For any ot e?* ,  let lt(,~) be the set of symbols from 
? that occur in a. 
A Thue system on .Y is a subset T of .Y*x .Y*. Each element (a, fl) of the Thue 
system is a rule. The Thue congruence ~-~ generated by T is the transitive, reflexive 
closure of the relation *-* defined as follows: for (a,/3) e T and 3', 8 e ?*, 3'a8 ~ 3"fl8 
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and yf8 ,-* ya& Two strings y, B E .Y* are congruent (mod T) if y ~-> 8. The con- 
gruence class of yE.Z* is [y]={SE.Z*IB ~-~ y}. 
Let T be a Thue system on .Z. If y o 8 and ly[>[81, then define y-*8; this is 
the reduction relation. Let ~ be the transitive, reflexive closure of -->. A string y 
is irreducible if there is no 8 such that y--> & 
A Thue system T is Church-Rosser if every congruence class has a unique 
irreducible string. Equivalently, T is Church-Rosser if for every a, r, a g> f implies 
that for some y, a -~ y and fl -~ y. 
If T is a Church-Rosser Thue system on .Z, then for each a E .Z* we write c/for 
the unique irreducible string in [a]. 
The usefulness of the Church-Rosser property for Systems of transformations (of 
any type of object) is that the order of application of transformations in reaching 
an irreducible object is not important. Thus, if T is a Thue system on .Y that is 
Church-Rosser, then for any x, y E Z*, xy can be reduced to £y, to x35, and to £y, 
and each of xy, ~y, x~, and ~y can be reduced to ~.  This is the reason for introducing 
the Church-Rosser property when studying the syntax of protocols. See [1] for a 
survey of properties of Thue systems that are Church-Rosser. 
The semantics of the four types of protocols that will be studied here are given 
by four different subsets of the set of cancellation rules. Each such subset will be 
given as a Thue system. For symmetric ascade protocols, the Thue system is 
T1 = {(DxEx, 1), (ExDx, 1)IX is a user}. For nonsymmetric cascade protocols, the 
Thue system is T 2 = {(DxEx, 1)IX is a user}. For symmetric name-stamp protocols, 
the Thue system is T3={(DxEx, 1), (ExDx, 1), (dxix, 1), (dix, 1)IX is a user}. For 
nonsymmetric name-stamp protocols, the Thue system is T4 = {(DxEx, 1), (dxix, 1), 
(dix, 1)IX is a user}. As shown in [2], each of TI-T4 is Church-Rosser. 
In any protocol, each user X has a certain collection of 'directory' functions 
available for his application as well as his own decrypfion function Dx. In a cascade 
protocol this set is Fx ={Dx}u E, while in a name-stamp rotocol this set is 
Fx={Dx}u Eu  Iu Ju{d}.  
Now we can present he formal definitions of protocols. 
A two-party name-stamp protocol P is specified by a sequence of finite strings 
c~i E {zl, z3, z4,. . . ,  z9}*, 1 ~ i <~ t, 
~E{Z2, Z3, Z4,...,Zg}*, l<~j<<-t ', 
where t'= t or t' = t - 1. For each pair of distinct users X, Y, let a~(X, Y), fly(X, Y) 
denote the strings c~ flj under the substitution 
zl ~--~ Dx, z4'-'> Ey, z7~'-> dx, 
z2"-> Dy, zs~"> ix, zs~--> dv, 
z3~-"> Ex, z6~"> iy, Zg~-"~ d.
For two users X and Y, let NI(X, Y)--a l (X,  Y), N2(X, Y)= ill(X, Y)N1(X, Y), 
N3(X, Y)= a2(X, Y)NE(X, Y), . . . ,  N2,(X, Y)= fi(X, Y)N2,-I(X, Y), 
N:i+l(X, Y)= ai+l(X, Y)N2i(X, Y), . . . .  In addition, we require that P be such 
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that no N~(X, Y) contains any occurrence of a symbol in Ju  {d}, and that each c;i 
and/3j be such that for every X, Y, ai(X, Y) and//j(X, Y) are irreducible. 
A name-stamp protocol P is symmetric f the semantics are given by the Thue 
system T3 and is nonsymmetric if the semantics are given by the Thue system T4. 
Let P be a two-party protocol specified by {c~i,/~jl 1 ~< i <~ t, 1 ~<j ~< t'}. Let X, Y 
be two distinct users. 
When X wishes to transmit a plaintext message M to Y, the sequence of messages 
exchanged is NI(X, Y)(M), N2(X, Y)(M), .. . ,  Nt+t,(X, Y)(M), where X and Y 
alternate sending messages with X beginning the sequence. Notice that composition 
of functions plays an important role. The exchange begins with X sending 
N~(X, Y)(M)= a~(X, Y)(M) and Y responding with N2(X, Y)(M)= 
~(X, Y)N~(X, Y ) (M)=~(X,  Y)(a~(X, Y)(M)), and this continues. 
A two-party cascade protocol P is a two-party name-stamp protocol where for each 
i, 1 ~< i ~< t, c;~ ~ (z~, z3, z4}*, and for each j, 1 ~<j <~ t' , /~ ~ {z2, z3, z4}*. The protocol 
P is symmetric f the semantics are given by the Thue system T~ and nonsymmetric 
if the semantics are given by the Thue system T2. 
Notice that in the definition of a protocol P, for any two users X and Y, user X 
can compute ach function ai(X, Y), 1 <~ i <<- t, in the sense that each a~(X, Y) is in 
F* .  Similarly, user Y can compute each function in/~j(X, Y). 
While much of the work on construction of decryption and encryption functions 
has been done using number theory and assuming fixed word length for messages 
(e.g., see [8]), these assumptions were not explictly made by Dolev and Yao, nor 
were they needed for their models of protocols. Thus, while the use of number- 
theoretic functions uggests that only symmetric protocols be considered, the models 
developed by Dolev and Yao do not prohibit he notion of nonsymmetric protocols. 
We will complete this section by providing some justification for the notion of 
nonsymmetric protocols. 
In uses of public-key encryption systems to provide secure network communica- 
tion, it is sometimes desirable to have 'master decryption functions'. A master 
decryption function is a function D~ such that for some set S of at least two users 
and all users X in S, D~Ex = 1 where Ex is the encryption function of X and 1 
is the identity. For example, a supervisor may have the (legitimate) need to decrypt 
all messages ent by a group of employees. Under the assumption of symmetry, 
such master decryption functions cannot exist. We give a simple proof of this fact. 
For some set S of at least two users, assume that DM is a master decryption 
function for S, i.e., D~ is a function from A* to A* and for every X in S, DMEx = 1. 
Recall that the composition of functions is associative. From the definition of D~, 
we see that for every X in S, Dx = 1Dx = (D~Ex)Dx. Since composition of functions 
is associative, (D~Ex)Dx = D~(ExDx) for all X. By the symmetry assumption, 
ExDx = 1 for all X. Hence, for all X in S, Dx = 1Dx = (DMEx)Dx = D~(ExDx)= 
D~ 1 = D~. The set S has at least two elements o that for all X, Y in S with X # Y, 
Dx = D~. since DM = Dx = Dr, contradicting the assumption that if X # Y, then 
{Dx, Dy, Ex, Er, ix, Jr, dx, dr, d} is a set of nine functions. 
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3. Security of protocols 
We are concerned with the properties of protocols that allow the transmission of 
a secret plaintext message between two users in such a way that no other user of 
the system can determine the nature of that message by applying certain operations 
to what is transmitted on the public channel. A user who attempts to discover the 
plaintext message will be referred to as a 'saboteur'. As in [6] we assume that a 
saboteur is a legitimate user of the network who has access to whatever is transmitted 
over the public channel, who can initiate an exchange with any other user, and who 
has the opportunity to be a receiver of an exchange initiated by any other user. We 
will say that a protocol is 'secure' if there is no choice of three users X, Y, Z such 
that if user X initiates an exchange with user Y to transmit a plaintext message M, 
then no matter what Z tries he is unable to discover the message M. The transmissions 
from X to Y and the replies from Y to X during the exchange are N1(X, Y)(M), 
N2(X, Y ) (M) , . . . ,  Nt+t,(X, Y)(M). Thus, informally, the protocol is secure if there 
is no function y that can be computed by Z such that for some i, yNi(X, Y) -% 1. 
In a symmetric protocol, every function in (E u D)* has a unique two-sided 
inverse, every function in (E u D u I)* has a left-inverse, and every function in 
(E u D u J u {d})* has a right-inverse. In a nonsymmetric protocol, only the identity 
function has a two-sided inverse, every function in (E u I)* has a left-inverse, and 
every function in (Du Ju{d})*  has a right-inverse. In each case, denote the 
appropriate inverse of y E F* by y-1. Note that two-sided inverses are unique and 
that y-~ is not unique if lt(y) n I # 0 or if d e It(y). 
Using these notions we see that a protocol is secure if there is no i such that the 
saboteur Z can compute the left-inverse of N~(X, Y), for some i ~> 1. 
Let P = {~/3i l  1 ~< i ~ t, 1 <~j <~ t'} be a tw0-party protocol. Exactly what things 
can the saboteur Z actually do in order to attempt to compute the inverse of some 
N~(X, Y)? We consider the worst-case situation of this by allowing Z to do almost 
anything that is consistent with the assumptions made in the Introduction and 
Section 2. Specifically, we assume that Z can do the following: 
(1) It is clear that Z can compute any function in F*  since every function in Fz 
is available to him. Recall that Fz = E u {Dz} if P is a cascade protocol and that 
Fz = E u {Dz} u I u J u {d} if P is a name-stamp protocol. 
(2) Note that Z is a user so that Z can initiate an exchange of a plaintext 
transmission with user B while claiming himself to be A. At the (2 j -1 )s t  stage, Z 
can send any string M 'e  A* to B in place of the message that would be appropriate 
if Z were following the rules of the protocol, so at the next step, Z would receive 
the reply message/3~(A, B)(M') from B. Hence, Z can obtain the string/3~(A, B)(M') 
for any j ~> 1 and any M'  e A*. 
(3) Suppose that Z wishes to obtain the string ai(A, B)(M') for some i ~ 2 and 
some M'E A*. If A initiates an exchange with B in order to transmit some plaintext 
message M, then at the 2(i - 1)st stage Z may 'block' the transmission of the reply 
message N2u-1)(M) that B sends to A and send the message M'  to A while claiming 
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to be B. Then A would send a~(A, B)(M') to B and Z could read this in the public 
channel. 
Thus, for any two-party protocol P = {t~,/~[ 1<~ i ~< t, 1 ~<j ~< t'} and any user Z, 
let V~p=Fzu{a,(A, B)lfor all users ,4, B with A#B,  i~>2}w{flj(A, B)[for all 
users A, B with A # B, j ~> 1}. From the above argument we see that for every choice 
of M 'e  A* and every ~re V~p, user Z can obtain the string ,r(M'). In this sense 
user Z can compute any of the functions in V~j,. We assume that this characterizes 
the set of functions that Z can compute, that is, Z cannot compute any function 
that is not in V~;~,. 
Suppose that for some i, Z can compute the left-inverse of N~(X, Y). By our 
assumptions above, this means that there is a 7 ~ V*e such that y is the left-inverse 
of Ni(X, Y). If i= 1, then Z can compute al(X, y) - i  since Nt(X, Y) = al(X, Y). 
Suppose that Z can compute 7 such that ~/is the left-inverse of N~(X, Y) for some 
i > 1. In this case N~(X, Y) = 8at(X, Y) for some 8 ~ l~p.  Now Z can compute 73 
and 78 is at(X, y)-i since (~)a l (X ,  Y)= 7(Sat(X, Y) ) ='7( N,( X, Y))= 1 (recall: 
at(X, Y) is irreducible). Thus we see that the protocol is insecure if and only if Z 
can compute al(X, y)-t. 
Now in fact it is sufficient o consider only a subset of l~e.  Let Xz.p = 
{Dz, Ez, Ex, Ey, iz, ix, iy, dz, dx, dg, d}u{a~(A,B)lA# B,A, Be{X, Y, Z}, i~>2}u 
{fi~(A, B) I A # B, A, B e {X, Y, Z}, j ~> 1}. We will show that it is sufficient to consider 
only Z*,I,. 
Let ~ = { DA, EA, iA, dA, d I A ~ {X, Y, Z}}. Let ¢ : F*--> 12" be the homomorphism 
determined by defining 
¢(DA) = Da 
for A ~ {X, Y,Z} 
.. $ (d )=d 
= Ez  
$(DA)  = Dzi  
, / , ( i2  = 
for A ~ {X, Y,Z}. 
It is clear that for all % 8 6 F*, ~---('~= qb(7)~k(8)'. For each user name A and 
each cancellation rule (p, 1) in the Thue system specifying the semantics of protocol 
P (i.e., Tt or T2 or T3 or T4) the rule (¢(P), 1) is a cancellation rule in the same 
Thue system. Hence, the homomorphism ~kis compatible with the reduction relation 
induced by that Thue system. Hence, for any 3' ~ F*, if ~? = 1, then ~ = 1. 
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These facts allow us to make the following conclusion. 
Lemma 3.1. Let P = {~, ~j[ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~j <~ t'} be a two-party protocol and let X, Y, 
Z be three user names. There exists an i such that for some y ~ I~p,  ~/is the left-inverse 
of Ni(X, Y) if and only if for some 8 ~ ~e,  8is the left-inverse oral(X,  Y). 
Now we are ready to give the formal definition of security. This definition is 
essentially the same as that of Dolev and Yao. 
Definition 3.2. Let P = {~i,/~jl 1 ~< i<~ t, 1 <~j<~ t'} be a two-party protocol. Let X, Y, 
Z be any three user names. The protocol P is insecure if there exists 
7~-Y~l, such that ~/ is the left-inverse of otl(X , Y), where Zz;p = 
{Oz, Ez, Ex, Ev, iZ, ix, iv, dz, dx, dv, d}u{a~(A,B) lA# B ,A ,B~{X,  Y, Z}, i~>2}u 
{g~(A, B)I A # B, A, B ~ {X, Y, Z}, j >~ 1}. Otherwise, P is secure. 
Notice from the definition that the property of being insecure is witnessed by a 
single saboteur. Since the definition of the protocol is uniform, if one user can 
successfully act as a saboteur, then so can every user. 
Dolev and Yao established an elegant characterization of symmetric ascade 
protocols that are secure, a characterization that allows one to determine by inspec- 
tion whether a protocol is secure. For this characterization the notion of balanced 
protocol is needed. 
Definition 3.3. (a) Let ~r ~ (E u D)* and let X be a user name. The string ~r has 
the balancing property with respect o X if Dx ~ lt(~r) implies Ex e lt(~r). 
(b) Let P = {J~/~jl 1 ~< i ~< t, 1 <~j ~< t'} be a two-party cascade protocol, and let 
X, Y be two distinct user names. The protocol P is balanced if 
(i) for every i>~ 2, a,(X, Y) has the balancing property with respect o X, and 
(ii) for every j t> 1,/3j(X, Y) has the balancing property with respect o Y. 
Prolmsitiou 3.4 ([6, Theorem 1]). Let P = { ~h ~j [ 1 ~ i ~ t, 1 ~ j ~ t'] be a two-party 
symmetric ascade protocol and let X and Y be two user names. Then P is secure if 
and only if both lt(al(X, Y)) c~ {Ex, Ey} ~ 0 and also P is balanced. 
Using the above notion we can now derive a characterization f secure nonsym- 
metric cascade protocols. While not as elegant as the characterization of secure 
symmetric ascade protocols, this characterization is such that the conditions can 
be checked by inspection. For deriving this characterization we need the following 
two lemmas. 
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Lemma 3.5. Let P = { ~, flj [ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~ j <~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol, and let X and Y be two user names. I f  lt(al(X, Y) ) c~ D # O, then P is secure. 
Proof. We have already assumed that a~(X, Y) is irreducible, so let a~(X, Y) be 
iZlDxtz2. For all y~ (E u D)*, consider yl~Dxlz2. Since tz~Dxtz2 is irreducible, 
Dxlz2 is irreducible; further, since the system T2 = {(DzEz, 1)lZ is a user} does not 
allow Dx to have a left-inverse, y/ZlDx/z2 = ylz~Dxtz2 which is not congruent o 1. 
Thus, if Z is a saboteur, then there is no y in Z~,  such that yat(X, Y) ~ 1, so 
that P is secure. [] 
Lemma 3.6. Let P = { ~i, fl~ l1 <<- i <~ t, 1 <<- j <~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol, let X, Y, Z be three user names, and let H={Dz,  Ex, Ey, Ez}*U 
{Ex, Ey, Ez}*Ex{Ex, Ey, Ez}*{Dx}+w{Ex, Ey, Ez}*Ey{Ex, Ey, Ez}*{Dy} +. I f  
Ey~lt(a~(X, Y)), then for all y~ H*, Ey~lt(ya~(X, Y)). 
Proof. Since Ey E lt(a~(X, Y)) we can proceed by induction on the length of y ~ H*. 
Assume that Ey ~ lt(yla~(X, Y)) for some y~ ~ H*, and let y = 8y~ with 8 e H. 
If Dy ~ It(8), then Er- ~ lt(yoq(X, Y)), since ya~(X, Y) = 8yla1(X, Y) = 
8y~a~(X, Y), and Ey¢lt(y la~(X,  Y)). If 8=w~Eyw2D~, with w~, w2~ 
{EX, Ey, Ez}*, 19 > O, then ya l (X  , Y) = wlEgw2DPyloq(X, Y) = 
wlEgw2OPyylog(X, Y), since no element of {Ex, Ey, Ez} + has a right inverse. Hence, 
EyElt(Totl(X, Y)). [] 
A corresponding result holds with the roles of X and Y interchanged. 
Now we are ready to characterize secure nonsymmetric cascade protocols. 
Theorem 3.7. Let P = { J~' flj ] 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <<- j <~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol. Let X, Y be distinct user names. Then P is secure if and only if either 
(a) l t(al(X, Y ) )mD#O,  
or 
(b) (i), (ii), and (iii) hold, where 
(i) for every i, 2<~ i<~ t, ot~(X, Y) is balanced with respect o X or ai(X, Y) 
contains a factor DxEv; 
(ii) for every.~ l<~j<~ t', flj(X, Y) is balanced with respect o Y or fl~(X, Y) 
contains a factor DyEx ; 
(iii) lt(a~(X, Y) )nE  #0. 
Proof. First we show that either condition (a) or condition (b) is sufficient. That 
condition (a) is sufficient follows from Lemma 3.5. Thus, assume that lt(al(X, Y)) m 
D = 0 but that condition (b) holds. 
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Let X, Y, Z be three distinct users, and let Z~e be as in Definition 3.2. If for 
some i, 2 ~< i <~ t, the string a,(X, Y) contains afactor DxEy, then for A, B ~ {X, Y, Z}, 
A~B,  the reduced string ai(A,B) is 81DAEB82. Hence, for every Yl, Y2, 
Y la i (A ,  B)Y2 = Y181DAEB82Y2 = yISIDAEa82Y2. Thus ,  if there exists ~ ~ ~*.e such 
that ~a~(X, Y) -~ 1, then ai(A, B) is not a factor of 7. Similarly, if for some j, 
1 <~j<<-t', flj(X, Y) contains a factor DyEx, then no string ~a~(X, Y) with factor 
/~j(A, B), A, B ~ {X, Y, Z}, A ~ B, can be reduced to 1. From Definition 3.2 we thus 
conclude that P is insecure if and only if there exists y ~ H* such that ya l (X  , Y) .L~ 1, 
where H~ = {Dz, Ex, Ey, Ez} u {ai(A, B)[ i >I 2, A ~ B, A, B e {X, Y, Z}, and 
a,(A, B) does not contain a factor DAEB} U {flj(A, B)]j >I 1, A # B, ,4, B e {X, Y, Z}, 
and //j(A, B) does not contain a factor DBEA}. Since a~(A, B) and ~j(A, B) are 
reduced, conditions (i) and (ii) imply that/-/1 _ H, where H is from Lemma 3.6. 
Since lt(a~(X,Y))c~D=O, we have a~(X,Y)e{Ex, Ey}*-{1}. If Eye 
lt(a~(X, Y)), then Ey~lt(ya~(X, Y)) for every y~H*  according to Lemma 3.6. 
Similarly, if Ex ~ lt(a~(X, Y)), then Ex c lt(ya~(X, Y)) for every y~ H*. Hence, P 
is a secure nonsymmetric protocol. 
Now assume that P is secure with lt(al(X, Y))c~D=0. Hence a l (X  , Y)= 
E n°i~m'Icn' E~E~I  for some n,,mj>>-O, i=O, l , j=l ,  L I f( i) and (ii) 
X~"Y  ~"X . . . . . .  , " " " , 
hold, then nothing has to be proved. So assume that (i) does not hold, and let 
i e {2,. . . ,  t} such that a~(X, Y) is not balanced with respect o X, and a~(X, Y) 
contains no factor of the form DxE¢. Then a~(X, Y)=E~D~c for some n~>0, 
m >i 1. By using a~(X, Z) ,  a saboteur Z can compute a left-inverse for Ex as 
follows: y~ = Dza~( X, Z)E~c -~ ~ X~,e (see Definition 3.2). Then y~Ex = 
D- z:- /'~m /~Tm-1 1~ z~zL, x~x ~x ~ 1. Analogously, Z can compute aleft-inverse for Ey by taking 
/'~n 1~ n /'~m l~'m--1 i:7 "~ 1. Thus ,  'y T2 = D~zai( Y, Z)E~ -~ ~ ~*,~', since T2Ey = x JzL ,  zx Jyx - .y  z .~y  = 
n m n m n o , T~T2 ' . . .  TI'T~ 'Y~ ~ ~*P satisfies ya~(X, Y) -~ 1, i.e., P is insecure, contradicting 
the assumption about P. Hence, (i) is satisfied. 
The assumption that (ii) is not satisfied yields the same contradiction. Hence, (ii) 
also is satisfied. [] 
So it is decidable in real time whether a given two-party cascade protocol is 
secure. Dolev and Yao proved that the question of whether a two-party symmetric 
name-stamp protocol is secure is decidable in polynomial time. Dolev, Even, and 
Karp [5] showed that this question is decidable in time O(n3), where 
n= E I l. 
~ieP  # jeP  
In fact, their algorithm also applies to two-party nonsymmetric name-stamp pro- 
tocols. On the other hand, there is no k-characterization f secure name-stamp 
protocols, as Book and Otto have observed [3], i.e., for no k >~ 1 is there a characteriz- 
ation of secure name-stamp protocols that uniformly involves the inspection of k 
operators of the protocol under consideration only. Thus, it appears that security 
for such protocols can be tested only by using algorithmic methods. Lower bounds 
on the complexity of the problem of determining whether a name-stamp protocol 
is secure have been studied by Pan [7]. 
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4. Protocols  that are verifiable 
For a protocol P ={di, ~ [ 1 <~ i ~< t, 1 ~<j ~< t'}, suppose that user X initiates an 
exchange with user Y to transmit plaintext message M. We illustrate the exchange 
as follows: 
X y 









The sender X would like to verify that the receiver Y actually receives the correct 
message at each stage. Also, the receiver Y would like to verify that the sender X 
receives the correct replies. If both of these things can be done, then the message 
authentication problem (in the sense of Diffie and Hellman [4]) can be solved. 
We must develop some new machinery if we are going to formally describe what 
it means to be 'verifiable'. 
Let P ={di, ~j I 1 i ~< t, 1 ~<j <~ t'} be a two-party protocol. 
(a) Let X and Y be two users and let M ~ A* be any plaintext message. Let X 
initiate an exchange with Y in order to transmit M. Suppose that for each j, 1 ~<j ~< t', 
on receiving message M'~ A*, X can determine whether M'= N2j(X, Y)(M) by 
using M, N2(X, Y)(M),..., N2~j_~)(X, Y)(M). If this can be done for every such 
choice of X, Y, and M, then P is .sender-verifiable. 
(b) Consider the situation described in (a). Suppose that for each i, 1 < i ~< t, on 
receiving message M'EA*, Y can determine whether M'=N2i_~(X, Y)(M) by 
using NI(X, Y)(M),..., N2i-3(X, Y)(M). If this can be done for each such choice 
of X, Y, and M, then P is receiver-verifiable. 
(c) If P is both sender-verifiable and receiver-verifiable, then P is verifiable. 
The definition of sender-verifiability mplies that the sender can determine whether 
the reply messages he receives comply with the protocol even though he may be 
unable to decrypt any of these messages. A similar statement holds for receiver- 
verifiability. It is assumed that each participant remembers all the messages received 
in the exchange. 
Recall that the power of a potential saboteur (as characterized by the functions 
in Z~, )  depends on the fact that in an exchange both the sender and the receiver 
follow the rules of the protocol and apply the specified operators to the messages 
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they receive without checking that the received message itself complies with the 
protocol. Is the power of the saboteur limited if we require that both the sender 
and the receiver check that the messages received comply with the protocol before 
continuing with the exchange? Let us consider the three sets of operators available 
to a potential saboteur Z. 
(1) Clearly, Z can still compute any function in F*. 
(2) By initiating an exchange with user B while claiming himself to be user A, 
Z can obtain ~(A,  B)(M) for any message M~A*.  Now suppose that Z then 
sends a message M'~A* to B. Receiver B expects this message to be 
a2(A, B )~(A ,  B)(M). If P is receiver-verifiable, then B can determine whether M'  
is a2(A, B)/31(A, B)(M) and if not, refuse to continue the exchange. If a2(A, B) ~ F*, 
then Z cannot obtain ~2(A, B)a2(A, B)~(A, B)(M) in this way. If a2(A, B) ~ F*, 
then Z can obtain ~2(A, B)a2(A, B)~I(A, B)(M) but using this technique he cannot 
obtain ~2(A, B)(M") for arbitrary M"e zl* as was assumed in Section 3. Thus we 
see that Z can obtain fl~(A, B)aj(A, B)/3j_I(A, B ) . . .  a2(A, B)//~(A, B)(M) for 
arbitrary M ~ A* as long as a~(A, B) is in F* for each i ~j.  In particular, Z can 
obtain ~j(Z, B)ai(Z, B)~j_~(Z, B) . . . a2(Z, B)/31(Z, B)(M) for every M e A* and 
every user B. 
(3) Suppose that Z wishes to obtain the string as(A, B)(M') for some i~  2 and 
some M'~ A*. The method described in Section 3 will fail since if P is sender- 
verifiable, then A need reply only if the reply message received at stage 2( i -  1) is 
N2<H)(M). 
The definition of verifiability is vague since it is not stated formally what is meant 
by "can determine whether...  ". Clearly, some notion of effective process is desired. 
Therefore, we restrict our attention to the following simpler notions. 
Definition 4.1. Let P = {c;i,/3jl 1 <~ i~ t, 1 ~ j  <~ t'} be a two-party protocol. Let X, Y 
be two arbitrary users. 
(a) A sequence of pairs (uj, vj), 1 ~ j~ t', with each uj, vj~ F*  irreducible, is a 
sender-verification sequence for P if for each j, l~j<~ t', ujN2(j_~)(X, Y)= 
vjN2j(X, Y). (Here, No(X, Y) is the identity function.) 
(b) A sequence of pairs (u~, vi), 1 <~ i < t, with each ui, vs e F*y irreducible, is a 
receiver.verification sequence for P if for each i, l ~ i < t, usN2~-l(X, Y)= 
v, S2,+~(X, Y). 
(c) A verification sequence {(us, v~)} is strong if each vs has a left-inverse. 
The existence of a strong sender-verification sequence implies that the sender X 
can check whether the reply messages he receives comply with the protocol, even 
though X may be unable to decipher any of those messages. It is assumed that the 
sender X always remembers the last message N2j_2(X, Yy(M) received. When a 
new reply message M' is received, X tries to determine whether M' is in fact the 
message N2j(X, Y)(M) that is expected. If the protocol has a strong sender- 
verification sequence, then for each j, 1 ~j~ t', there exist u~, vj~ F*  such that 
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ujN2~-2(X, Y ) (M)= vjN2j(X, Y)(M), and each vj has a left-inverse. Thus, the 
equation ujN2j_2(X, Y) = vjw has a unique irreducible solution: w = 
~-tuiN2j_2(X , Y). Hence, if the received message is M', then by applying vj to this 
message and comparing the result with uiN2j_2(X , Y)(M),  X can determine whether 
the reply message received is the unique reply that complies with the protocol. 
Notice that the argument in the last paragraph does not demand that sender X 
actually be able to compute vf ~. 
The notion of receiver-verifiability s just the symmetric notion of sender- 
verifiability. We summarize this discussion formally with the following result. 
Theorem 4.2. Let P be a two-party protocol. 
(a) I f  there exists a strong sender-verification sequence for P, then P is sender- 
verifiable. 
(b) I f  there exists a strong receiver-verification sequence for P, then P is receiver- 
verifiable. 
Now let us consider the following example. 
Example 4.3. Let P = {c;i,/3ill ~< i~ <2, 1 <~j<~2} be the two-party protocol defined 
by al(X, Y) = Ey, ~I(X, Y) = Ex, a2(X, Y) = Ey, and ~2(X, Y) = Dy. When user X 
initiates an exchange of messages with user Y in order to transmit plaintext message 
M ~ A*, the following messages are exchanged: NI(X, Y)= Ey(M),  N2(X, Y)= 
ExEy(M) ,  N3(X,  Y)  = EyExEy(M), N4(X, Y) ---- ExEy(M). For a saboteur Z ~ X, 
Y, the set Z~:p then contains the operator//2(X, Y) = Dy, implying that P is insecure, 
since/32(X, Y)al(X, Y) = DyEyo 1. 
The pairs (ExEy, 1), (1, 1) form a strong sender-verification sequence for P, since 
ExEy = 1. N2(X, Y), and I • N2(X, Y) = ExEy = 1. N4(X, Y). In addition, the pair 
(EvEx, 1) forms a strong receiver-verification sequence for P, since EyExNI(X, Y) = 
EyExEy = 1 • N3(X, Y). Thus, the sender X as well as the receiver Y can actually 
check whether or not a message received complies with the protocol before continu- 
ing the exchange. 
The only way Z can discover the plaintext message M is by using an 
operator of the form /32(A, Y) for some user A ~ Y, since Dy ~ F*. However, 
since P is verifiable, Z can apply /32(A, Y) only as part of the 
operator /32(A, Y)a2(A, Y)/31(A, Y), as pointed out earlier. Since 
//2(A, Y)a2(A, Y)~I(A, Y) = DyEyEA = EA e Fz, this means that Z cannot discover 
the plaintext message M, i.e., the protocol P is secure provided the sender and the 
receiver participating in an exchange of messages continue the exchange only if the 
messages they receive comply with the protocol. 
The above example clearly shows that the notion of verifiability leads to a weaker 
notion of security. In the following we are interested incharacterizations of two-party 
protocols that have (strong) receiver- and sender-verification sequences. 
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5. Verifiability for cascade protocols 
We will provide characterization theorems for those two-party protocols that have 
verification sequences. In this section we consider only cascade protocols. We begin 
by considering the symmetric ase. Recall that in this case, every y ~ (E w D)* has 
a unique two-sided inverse so that every verification sequence is strong. 
Lemma 5.1. Let P = { ~i, fl~[l <<. i <<- t, l <<. j <~ t'} be a two-party symmetric ascade 
protocol, and let X and Y be any two user names. 
(a) I f  P has a receiver-verification sequence, then for i >i 2, either ai(X, Y) 
{EX, Ey}* ~ {By, Dx}* or ai(X, Y) = WlExW2W 3 for some wl, wa ~ {Ey, Dx}* and 
w2a{Ex, Ey}* with w~ ~ being a prefix of ~i_~(X, Y). 
(b) I f  P has a sender-verification sequence, then for j >i 1, either flj(X, Y) 
{Ex, Ey}* ~ {Ex, Dy}* or ~j(X, Y) = wxEyw2w3 for some wi, Wa ~ {Ex, Dy}* and 
w2e {Ex, Ey}* with w~ 1 being a prefix of aj(X, Y). 
Proof. We will prove (a), the proof of (b) being similar. 
Let i~>2. Since P has a receiver verification sequence, there exist u, 
1) E {Ex, Ey, my}*  such that uN2i_3(X  , Y) = DN2i_I(X , Y).  Now 
va,(X, Y)fl,-I(X, Y)N2t-a(X, Y)=vN2,-I(X, Y )~ vN2,_,(X, Y)=uN2,-3(X, Y) 
and uN2~_3(X, Y ) -~ uN2i-3(X, Y) so that va~(X, Y)f lH(X, Y)N2i_3(X, Y) 
uN2~_a(X, Y). Since N2~_3(X, Y) has a two-sided inverse, we conclude that 
vat(X, Y)fli-l(X, Y) ~'> u, and so vai(X, Y)fli-1(X, Y)= t~ (and u can be chosen 
to be irreducible so t7 = u). 
If Dx ~ It(ai(X, Y)), then a~(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey}*. Similarly, if Ex ~ It(a~(X, Y)), 
then ai(X, Y) ~ {Ey, Dx}*. So assume that Dx e It(ai(X, Y)) and Ex ~ It(a~(X, Y)). 
We claim that a~(X, Y)fl~_I(X, Y) contains no factor of the form ExEkDx, k > O. 
This follows from the fact that v E {Ex, Ey, Dy}*, since then u = 
vtri( X, Y) f lH ( X, Y) = vtri( X, Y) flH ( X, Y) would also contain this factor, contrary 
to u being in {Ex, Ey, Dy}*. 
Now tri(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey, Dx}* and fli-1(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey, Dy}* are irreducible. 
Thus, at(X, Y)= ulw3 and fli-1(X, Y)= w;lu2 with tri(X, Y)~i-I(X, Y)= ulu2. In 
particular, ut does not contain a factor of the form ExEkDx, and Ex ~ It(w3). But 
Ex ~ It(try(X, Y)), and so ul = wiExw2 for some wl ~ {Ey, Dx}* and w2e {Ex, Ey}*, 
while w3 e {Ev, Dx}*. Thus, a~(X, Y) has the form claimed in (a). [] 
Let P ={tii,/3j} be a two-party protocol, and let X and Y be two user names. 
Assume that for some i >I 2, ai(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey}* u {Eg, Dx}* or ai(X, Y) = 
wlExw2w3 for some wl, w3e{Ey, Dx}* and w2~{Ex, Ey}* with w~ t being a prefix 
of/3i_l(X, Y). Define ui-t and vt-t as follows: 
Ui_ 1 
a,(X, Y)fl,_,(X, Y) 
fl,_t(X, Y) 
Exw2W3fl,_l( X, Y) 
if t~,(X, Y)~ {Ex, Ey}*, 
if a,(X, Y) ~ {EY, Dx}*, 
if ai(X, Y) = wlExw2W3; 
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t l v,_, = (a,(X, Y))- '  
lw -' 
if ai(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey}*, 
if a,(X, Y) e { Ey, Dx } *, 
if a,(X, Y) = w, Exw2W3. 
Then u,_,, v~_~  {Ex, Ey, Dy}* satisfy v,_,N2,_I(X, Y) = u,_,Nz,_3(X, Y). 
Together with Lemma 5.1 this observation implies the following characterization 
of protocols that have verification sequences. 
Theorem 5.2. Let P = { ~ flj I 1 <~ i <<- t, 1 <~ j <~ t'} be a two-party symmetric ascade 
protocol, and let X and Y be any two user names. 
(a) P has a strong receiver-verification sequence if and only if for all i>~ 2, either 
ai(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey}* u {Ey, Dx}* or ai(X, Y) = wlExw2w3 for some wl, ws 
{Er, Dx}* and w2 ~ {Ex, Ey}* with w~ 1 being a prefix of fli_l(X, Y). 
(b) P has a strong sender-verification sequence if and only if for all j >1 1 either 
flj(X, Y) ~ {Ex, Ey}* u {Ex, Dr}* or fli(X, Y) = wlEgw2w3 for some wl, w3 
{Ex, Dy}* and w2~ {Ex, Ey}* with w~ 1 being a prefix of %(X, Y). 
Obviously, the conditions for verification sequences given in Theorem 5.2 can be 
checked by an algorithm that runs in linear time. 
Suppose that one knows that a protocol P has a sender-verification sequence. 
Notice that the comments following Lemma 5.1 allow one to construct such a 
sequence and that this construction can be carried out in linear time. 
Now we consider the nonsymmetric case. Notice that in this case there exist 
e (E u D)* such that y has no left-inverse. Thus, the existence of a verification 
sequence does not imply the existence of a strong-verification sequence. Throughout 
the remainder of this section we will assume a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol P = {c;~, fljJ 1 ~< i ~< t, 1 ~<j <~ t'} and two distinct user names X and Y. 
Lemma 5.3. (a) I f  P has a receiver-verification sequence, then for each i >t 2, ai(X, Y) 
does not contain a factor DxEy. 
(b) I f  P has a sender-verification sequence, then for each j >- 1, flj(X, Y) does not 
contain a factor DyEx. 
Proof. We prove part (a), the proof of part (b) being similar. 
Assume that for some i~> 2, ai(X, Y) contains a factor DxEy, i.e., ai(X, Y) is of 
the form wl DxEyw2. Since P has a receiver-verification sequence, there exist irreduc- 
ible u, v e {Ex, Ey, Dy}* such that uN2~-s(X, Y)= vN2H(X, Y). But 
vN2,-x(X, Y)=va,(X,  Y)f lH(X, Y)N2,-s(X, Y) 
= vw, DxEyW2,8,_l(X, Y)N2,-a(X, Y) 
= vwlDxEyW2~i-l(X, Y)Nzi-S(X, Y), 
since Dx has no left-inverse and Ey has no right-inverse. Hence, with Izlox denoting 
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the number of occurrences of the letter Dx in the word z, we have 
luN2,-3(X, Y)ID,,=IvN2,-,( X, Y)ID,, 
= IvwiDxEgw2fl,_~(X, Y)N2,_3(X~"Y)Io x 
1 +]w2flH(X, Y)N2,_3(X, Y)]ox 
1 + I~Nr2,_3(X, Y)[Dx = 1 + luN21_3(X, Y)]Dx, 
a contradiction. Thus, for every i ~> 2, a~(X, Y) does not contain a factor DxEy. [] 
Since for all i>~2 and all j~> 1, a~(X, Y) and/3j(X, Y) are irreducible, Lemma 
5.3 immediately implies the following fact. 
Corollary 5.4. (a) I f  P has a receiver-verification sequence, then for each i>~ 2, 
cz,(X, Y)e{Ex, Ey}*{Dx}*. 
(b) I f  P has a sender-verification sequence, then for each j~  1, ~j(X, Y)e 
{Ex, Ey}*{Dy}*. 
Since a user can apply only his own decryption function, the operators a~(X, Y) 
(flj(X, Y)) that contain occurrences of the decryption function Dx (De)  are of 
special interest in a protocol that has a receiver-verification sequence (sender- 
verification sequence). The following two lemmas deal with these operators. 
Lemma 5.5. (a) Let P have a receiver-verification sequence. Then for each i >~ 2, if 
there exist w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > 0 such that a~(X, Y) = wD~, then for some z 
(E u D)*, Y) = E ,2. 
(b) Let P have a sender-verification sequence. Then for each j >~ 1, if there exist 
w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > 0 such that flj(X, Y) = wD~, then for some z ~ (E w D)*, 
N2j - l (X ,  Y)= E~7,. 
Proof. Again, we only prove part (a), the proof of part (b) being similar. 
Let i~>2 with ai(X, Y)= wD~c for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > 0. Assume that 
there exist some q, 0~ < q <p, and irreducible z ~ (E u D)*, z not beginning with Ex, 
such that N2i-2(X, Y )= Eqxz. 
By hypothesis, there exist irreducible u, v ~ { Ex, Ey, Dy}* satisfying 
uN2~_3(X~ Y)= vN2H(X, Y). Now vN2,_I(X, Y)= oa,(X~'Y)N2,-2(X, Y)= 
vwDPxE~z=vwDPx-qz, since q<p and Dx has no left-inverse. Further, 
N2i-2(X, Y)=fli-1(X, Y)N2i-a(X, Y)= ~H(X, Y)N2"~_3(X, Y). Henc, there are 
irreducible Yl, Y2 e (E • D)* and I ~> 0 such that fl~-1(X, Y) = "riDIY, N2~_3(X, Y) = 
Etyy2, and N2i-2(X, Y) = Y~Y2. Thus, E~z= N2~-2(X,Y) = y~y2, i.e., E~:z and Y~Y2 
are two factorizations of the same word. 
If [y2[>[z[, then y2=E~xz for some O<r<~q, and y1=E~ -'. Since r>0 and 
u e {Ex, Ev, Dy}*, this implies uN2~_3(X, Y) = uE~yy2 =uE~yE~xz = uE~yE'x z.Thus, 
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! r uE yExz  = uN21_3(X, Y) = vN2~_~(X, Y)= vwDP-~z, acontradiction since r > 0 and 
p-q>O.  
On the other hand, if 172l <~lzl, then 7~ = E~c 73 and z = 73 72 for some 7a e (E ~ D)*. 
This gives vwDP-°7372 = vwDP-~z = vN2i_~(X, Y) = uN2,_a(X , Y) = uE~y72. 
Hence, [uE~yy21Dx = [vw D~-q 73 7u[ox >I P - q + [ 721ox = P - q + [uE~yY2ID,,, since u e 
{Ex, Ey, Dy}*, and Dx has no left-inverse. Now q <p gives the intended contradic- 
tion, thus completing the proof of part (a). [] 
Lemma 5.6. (a) Let P have a receiver-verification sequence. I f  for some i>-2, 
a~(X, Y )= wD p with w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, then either (i) or (ii) holds, where 
(i) fl,_,(X, Y)= EVxz; 
(ii) f i l l (X,  Y) = E~cDrv for some 0<~ q<p, and r>-O, N2~_~(X, Y) = E'vEVx-~Z, 
and w ~ {Ey}*{Ex}* or w = w~E p-q. 
(b) Let P have a sender-verification sequence. I f  for some j >i 1, fl~(X, Y) = wD p 
with w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, then either (i) or (ii) holds, where 
(i) og(X , Y)= EWz, 
(ii) as(X , Y)= E ~v D'x for some 0 <~ q < p, and r>--O, N2s- 2( X, Y)= E "x E W-~ z, and 
w ~ {Ex}*{Ey}* or w = w, EPy -~. 
Proof. As before, we only prove part (a), the proof of part (b) being similar. 
Assume that for some i ~> 2, ai(X, Y) has the form wD p for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* 
and p > 0. If fli-l(X, Y)= EPxz, then nothing has to be proved. So assume that 
/3i-l(X, Y) = E~c~ where 0<~ q <p and '7 ~ {Ex, Ey, Dy}* does not begin in Ex. 
By Lemma 5.5(a), ai(X, Y )= wD p implies N2~_2(X, Y)=EPz  for some z e 
(EuD)* .  Now N2~_2(X, Y)=[3H(X,  Y)N2~-3(X, Y), and hence N2~-2(X, Y)= 
3i-x(X, Y)N2i-a(X, Y)=fli-~(X, Y)N2~-3(X, Y). Since f i l l (X ,  Y)and N2~_3(X, Y) 
are irreducible, this means that there exists an r >~ 0 such that fl~_~(X, Y )= y~D'y, 
N2~-a(X, Y )= E~,y2, and N2~-2(X, Y)= yxy2. Thus, we have E~/=/3 i -a (X ,  Y)= 
ylD~,, and EPz = N2~-2(X, Y) = Y~Y2. The equation E~:~/= y~D~, implies that 17,1 
q, i.e., y~ = E~c*h and ~ = 7hD~, for some ~h e {Ex, Ey, Dy}*. 
Assume that lyl l> q. Then vh # 1, and since 7 h is a prefix of 77, this means that 
~h = Err/2 or 7/1 = Dgv/2 because ~/~ {Ex, Ey, Dy}* does not begin in Ex. Hence 
y~ = E~rEy'O2 or y~ = E~Dy'tl2, contradicting the equation EPxz = YlY2, since p > q. 
Thus, Yl = Eqx, and y2= EP-qz, and so f i l l (X,  Y )= E~xD~ and N2~-a(X, Y)= 
E~-y2 = E'vEVx-qZ. 
It remains to determine the form of w ~ {Ex, Ey}*. If w e {Ey}*{Ex}*, then we 
are done. So assume that w~{Ev}*{Ex}*, i.e., w= w~ExE~E~ for some w~ 
{Ex, Ey}*, n >i 1, and m ~> 0. 
Since P has a receiver-verification sequence, there exist u, v e {Ex, Ev, Dr}* such 
that uN2,_3(X, Y) = vN2H(X, Y). Now uN2i-3(X, Y) = uE~vEVx-~Z = uE'vEVx-~Z, 
since p > q and Dx ~ It(u), and 
vN2,_a(X, Y)=va, (X,  Y)f lH(X, Y)N2,-3(X, Y) 
= vwDVxE~xD~E~EVx-~Z = vw~ExE'~,E'~cz = vwIExE'~,E'~cz, 
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since Dx ~ It(v). Hence uE~E~c-qz = VWlExE~,E~cz, which implies that m ~>p - q, 
i.e., w ends in EPx -q. [] 
Lemmas 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6 give necessary conditions for a nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol to have a receiver-verification sequence (respectively, a sender-verification 
sequence). We will show that these conditions are also sufficient, thus giving a 
characterization f nonsymmetric cascade protocols that have verification sequences. 
Theorem 5.7. Let P = {Ji, flj l 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~ j <~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol. Then the following are equivalent: 
(a) P has a receiver-verification sequence. 
(b) Let X and Y be any two user names. Then for each i >i 2, one of (i), (ii), (iii) 
holds, where 
(i) a,(X, Y)~{Ex ,  Ey}*; 
(ii) ai(X, Y) = wDPX for some w e {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, and/3i_l(X, Y) = EPxz; 
(iii) ai(X, Y) = wD~c for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, f i l l (X ,  Y) = EqD'y  for 
some O<~q<p and r~>0, N2~-3(X, Y)=E~EPx-qZ, and we{Ey}*{Ex}* or w ends 
in EPx -q. 
Proof. That (a) implies (b) follows from Corollary 5.4(a) and from Lemma 5.6(a). 
So assume that (b) holds. We must show that P has a receiver-verification sequence. 
Let X and Y be any two user names. For i >/2 we define two words u~-i and vi_~ 
as follows: 
{ a~(X, Y)gi-~(X, Y) i f ( i )or( i i )ho lds,  u~_~ := w~D~ if (iii) holds, and w = w~EPx -q, 
D~. if (iii) holds, but w does not end in EPx-q; 
1 if (i) or (ii) holds, or if (iii) holds and w ends in EPx -q, 
Vi-t :--- EPx-q-mDyn if (iii) holds, and w = E~,E~c with m <p - q. 
It is easy to check that the pairs (u~, v~), 1<~ i< t, form a receiver-verification 
sequence. [] 
Similarly, we have the following fact. 
Theorem 5.8. Let P = {Ji, fljl 1 <- i <- t, 1 <~j <~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric cascade 
protocol. Then the following are equivalent: 
(a) P has a sender-verification sequence. 
(b) Let X and Y be any two user names. Then for each j >~ 1, one of (i), (ii), (iii) 
holds, where 
(i) fls(X, Y )~{Ex ,  Ey}*; 
(ii) ,Sj(X, Y)  = wD~ for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, and as(X, Y) = EWz; 
(iii) flj(X, Y) = wD~, for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, and %(X, Y) = E~.D'x 
for some O ~ q < p and r >-O, N2j-2(X, Y) = E'x E ~-q z, and w ~ { Ex } * { Ey } * or w ends 
in EPy -q. 
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The conditions given in Theorem 5.7 and Theorem 5.8 are such that they can be 
checked in linear time. Further, from the proof of Theorem 5.7 we see that given a 
two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocol P that has a sender-verification sequence 
(receiver-verification sequence), one can construct such a sequence for P in linear 
time. 
Let P be a two-party nonsymmetric ascade protocol. If  P has a receiver- 
verification sequence, then one can construct such a sequence (ui-1, vi-1), 2 <~ i ~< t, 
for P as described in the proof of Theorem 5.7. Suppose that for some i I> 2, 
(a) a,(X, Y) e {Ex, Ev}*, or 
(b) ai(X, Y) = wDPx and fl~-l(X, Y) = EPxz for some w ~ {Ex, Ey}* and p > O, or 
(c) ai(X, Y) = WlEPx-qDPx and fl~_~(X, Y) = E~:D~ for some w~ ~ {Ex, Ex}*, p > 
O, O<~q<p, r>~O. 
In each of these three cases, the construction yields v~-i = 1 so that vH is left- 
invertible. 
Consider the fourth case that results from the proof of Theorem 5.7. Here, 
ai(X, Y) ---- x.,~'nyx~xxJxK'ml'~P and fl~_l(X, Y) = EqxD'g with 0<~ n, 0<~ r, O~ < q <p, and O~ 
__  l£ 'p - -q - -m l '~n  m < p-  q. In this case, vH-  ,-,x ,_,y. Clearly, v~-I is left-invertible if and only 
if n = 0, since Dy is not left-invertible. 
Thus we see that for a two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocol P, the existence 
of a receiver-verification sequence {(uH,  vi-~)}[=2 does not necessarily imply that 
P is receiver-verifiable, in contrast o the case of symmetric protocols. However, if 
for each i,2<~ i<~ t, the word vH is left-invertible, then this receiver-verification 
sequence is strong and so can be used to witness the receiver-verifiability of P. 
Considerations of the same kind apply to two-party nonsymmetric cascade pro- 
tocols that are sender-verifiable. 
6. Verification sequences for nonsymmetric name-stamp rotocols 
In a name-stamp rotocol the functions ix and dx (or d) may be used so that 
some operators may not have two-sided inverses. This is certainly the case for 
nonsymmetric name-stamp protocols ince the only function with a two-sided inverse 
is the identity function. Thus, in this case we have characterizations forthe existence 
of verification sequences but not for strong-verification sequences. 
In order to establish our characterization theorems, we develop a sequence of 
technical lemmas. To do so we assume a fixed two-party nonsymmetric name-stamp 
protocol P = {~/3j  ]1 <~ i ~< t, 1 <~j <~ t'} and two arbitrary users X and Y. Recall that 
for each k, l<~k~ < t+t', Nk(X, Y )e (EuDuI ) * .  
Definition 6.1. An irreducible word z is called blocking if z ~ (Du Ju  {d})(E u I). 
Notice that if a word z is blocking, then for all w~, w:e F*, wlzw2 = wxzw2 since 
no symbol in D u J u {d} has a left-inverse and no symbol in E w I has a right- 
inverse. 
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Lemma 6.2. I f  P has a receiver-verification sequence, then for each i>>. 2, a~(X, Y) 
does not contain a blocking factor. 
Proof. Assume that for some i~>2, a~(X, Y) contains a blocking factor, i.e., 
tr i(X,Y)=w, zw2 for some ze(Du Jw{d}) (EwI ) .  Hence, N2~_~(X,Y)= 
oti(X, Y)N2i-2(X, Y)= w, zw2?q2[-2(X, Y)=w,z'~v2N2i_2(X, Y). Since z= y8 with 
Y ~ D u J u {d} and 8 e E u / ,  and since no symbol in J u {d} occurs in N2i_a(X, Y), 
we have y ~ D. Since lt({a~(X, Y)}) n D c {Dx}, this means that y = Dx. 
Since P has a receiver-verification sequence, there exist irreducible u, v e F*  such 
that uiV2,..a(X, Y )=vN2H(X,  Y). But 
vN2,_,(X, Y) =va, (X,  Y)fl,_,(X, Y)N2,-a(X, Y) 
Hence, 
= vw, DxBw2fl, l(X, Y)N2,-3(X, Y) 
= vw, DxSw2~i'i(X, Y)N2,-3(X, Y). 
luN2,-s( X,"Y)lox = IvN2,_,( X, Y)IDx 
=Ivw, DxBW2~,-,(X, Y)N2,-s(X, Y)lox 
1 + IN2i-s(X, Y)lo,,. 
Now u e F*  and Dx ~ Fy and Dx has no left inverse so that luN2,-3(X, ')lOx = 
[N2,-3(X, g)[v~c Thus, we have [uN2~_S(X, Y)[ox ~ > I+[uN2,_S(X, g)lo~ a contra- 
diction. [] 
From Lemma 6.2 we have the following useful fact. 
Corollary 6.3. I f  P has a receiver-verification sequence, then for each i >~ 2, ai( X, Y) 
(Eu  I )*(DwJu{d})* .  
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that P has a receiver-verification sequence. Let i >1 2. Suppose 
that a,(X,Y)=wlw2 with w le (Eu I ) *  and w2~({Dx}uJu{d}) +. Then 
~Nr2i_2(X , Y) = w21z where z ~ (E u D w I)*. 
Proof. If w2 = CLAW3 for some A ~ {X, Y}, then N2i-2(X, Y)= w~liAZ for some z E 
(E u D u I)*, since otherwise 
N2,-1(X, Y)=a,(X,  Y)N21-2(X, Y)=W, dAw3N2,-2(X, Y) 
= WldAw3N2,-2(X, Y) 
would contain an occurrence of dA. Thus, N2~_2(X, Y) has the desired form. The 
same argument holds if w2 begins with d. 
If w2 = D~ w3 for some p > 0 and ws does not begin with Dx, then Wa = 1 or w 3 
begins with dA for some A e {X, Y} or wa begins with d. In either case the argument 
above shows that N2~-2(X, Y) = w~w4. We must prove that w4 begins with E~. 
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Assume that w4=E~cz for some q with O<~q<p and ze(E~D~I )* ,  where z 
does not begin with Ex. By hypothesis there exist irreducible u, v e F*  such that 
UN2,-s(X, Y)= vN2,_,(X, Y). Now, 
Further, 
vN2,_~(X, Y) = va,(X, Y)N2i-2(X, Y) = VWlD~xwsw3~E~z = vw~D~x-~Z. 
N2,-2(X, Y)=fl , - I (X, Y)N2,-3(X, Y)=fl,_,(X, Y)N2,-3(X, Y). 
Hence, there are 3"~, 3'2 e F* and 3'3 e ({Dy} ~ J u {d})* such that fli_~(X, Y) = 3'13'3, 
N2,_3(X, Y) = 3'3~72, and N2,_2(X , Y) = 3'172. Thus, w~lE~xz = N2i_2(X , Y) = 3'~72. 
Since u e F*  and since 3'7~e ({Ey}~ I)*, [uN2,_3(X , Y)[o,, = [u3"3172[ox = [3"2[0x 
while IvN2i_~(X, g)lo =l-F  D - zlo > (p-q)+lzlo =(p-q)+lw lE zlo  
since w~ ~ e ({Ex} u I)*. Hence 
luNz,-s(x, Y)lox = I Y)lo,, >i (P - q) + I E l  zlox 
= (P - q) + 13', >t (P - q) + 13" lox 
= (p -q)+ luN2,_s (X ,  Y)lo, o 
a contradiction. Hence, w4 = E~.z. [] 
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that P has a receiver-verification sequence. Let i >~ 2. Suppose 
that ai( X, Y) = wl w2 with wl e ( E w I)* and w2 e ({Dx} u J u {d}) +. Then either (a) 
or (b) holds: 
(a) /3,-1(X, Y) = w~lz for some ze  r* ;  
(b) w2 = w3w4 where w3e({Dx}u Ju{d})  + and w4e({Dx}u Ju{d})* ,  
~i-I(X, Y) = w413' for some 3' e ({Dy} u J u {d})*, and N2i-3(X, Y) = y-1 w31z for 
some z e ( E u D u I)*. Further, either (bi) w3 e ( J  u {d}) +, or (bii) w3 = 82Dx61 with 
81 e ( Ju  {d})* and either (i) Wl = woEx621 for some Woe (E u I)*, or (ii) there exist 
Woe ({Ey} u I )*  and w5 e {Ex}({Ex} u I)* ~ {1} satisfying w~ = WoW5 and ExS~ ~ = 
w6w5 for some w~ e ({Ex} w I)*. 
Proof. If w21 is a prefix of fl,-l(X, Y), then (a) holds. Otherwise, asst/me that 
w2 = wsw4 with wse ({Dx}u Ju{d})  +, w4e ({Dx}u Ju{d})* ,  and /3,_~(X, Y) = 
w2~y where 3' e F*  does not begin with the first letter of w31. 
We see from Lemma 6.4 that N2~-2(X, Y )=w~Iz=w2lw~z for some ze 
(Eu  Du I)*. Now N2~_2(X, Y )=#. (X ,  Y)N2~_s(X, Y) so that 
N2,-2(X, Y)=fl,_,(X, Y)N2,-s(X, Y)=fl , - I (X,  Y)N2,-3(X, Y). 
Since /3i_l(X, Y) and N2i-s(X, Y) are irreducible, this implies that there exist 
T1 E F* ,  T2 E ({Dy} u J U {d})*, and Y3 e (E u D u I)* such that flr--l(X, Y) = 713'2, 
N2i-3(X, Y)=y2-13'3, and N2i-2(X, Y)=3'13"3. Since w~le({Ex}u I )  * and 3'2e 
({Dy} u £u  {d})*, w~13" =/3i_l(X, Y) = 3"13"2 implies that }w~l[ ~ 13'11, i.e., 3"1 = w~3'o 
and T = ToT2 for some 3"o e r * .  
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We claim that Y~ = w; I- If not, then Iw; ~] < ITd and To# 1. Let 70 = sy~ for some 
S~Fy. Then Tl w;13,o -1 , = = w4 s3 0 and so w;~w31z = N2 i_2(X  , Y) = 713,3 = w;~s3,~3,3 
which implies that w~z = s3,~3'a. Thus, the first letter of w3 ~ is s as is the first letter 
of Yo, contradicting the choice of 3, = 3,03'2. 
Since 3,~ = w; ~, we have 3' = 3'2 so that V e ({Dy} w J u {d})* and N2~_3(X, Y) = 
3,-13,3 = 3,-1W31Z. 
What remains is to determine the form of Wl e (E u I)*. If w3 ~ (J w {d}) +, then 
case (hi) holds. Otherwise, assume w3 = 82Dx8~ for some 8~ e ( Jw {d})* and 82e 
({Dx}uJu{d})* .  
Since P has a receiver-verification sequence, there exist irreducible u, v e F*  such 
that uN2i-3(X, Y)= vN2i-l(X, Y). Now uN2i-3(X, Y)= u3"-lw31z = 
u~/-18?~Ex~2~z=u3,-~8-~Ex,~2*z since N2i_3(X, Y)= 3,-xS?1Ex82~z and Dx~ 
It(u). Also, vN2H(X, Y)= vai(X, Y)f lH(X,  Y)N2i-3(X, Y) where a,(X, Y)= 
w~w3w4, f i l l (X,  Y)= w~13,, and N2,_3(X, Y)= 3,-~w31z, so that vN2,_,(X, Y)= 
vw, z. Thus, u3,-~8-(~ExS-~Iz = uN2i_a(X, Y) = vN:i_~(X, Y) = Dw1z .  
If w~ ends in Ex62 ~, then w~ = woEx82 ~ for some woe (E ~ I)* and ease (bii)-(i) 
holds. 
If w~ does not end in Ex62 ~, then suppose that wl = wow5 for some wo e ({Ey} ~ I)* 
and w5 e {Ex}({Ex} ~ I)* w {1}. We must show that w~ is a suffix of ExS~ -~. If w5 = 1, 
then this is true. Otherwise, let ws=Exw7 for some w7e({Ex}~I)*.  Now, 
U3"-]~5"II Ex~52]z = VW]g = DWoExw7 g = VWoExW7Z implies that w5 = ExW7 is a suffix of 
Ex~ ~. 
Now assume that w~ does not end in Ex82 ~ and w~ has no factorization WoW5 
with Woe ({Ey}wI)* and w~e{Ex}({Ex}~ I)*w{1}. Then w~=z~Exz2Eyz~ for
some z~, z3 e (E w I)* and z2e I*. Hence, vw~z = VZlExZ2Eyzaz = vzlExhEgZ3Z since 
w]z is irreducible and Dx ~ It(v). Thus, u3,-18-(~ Ex821z = vw~z = vZ~Exz~Egz3Z. But 
82 ~ e ({Ex} w I)* and so Ex82 ~ must be a suffix of z3 and, hence, of Wl, contradicting 
the choice of cases. Thus, w] has the desired form. [] 
While Lemma 6.5 is very technical and its proof is very tedious, it is the tool 
needed for the main result. 
Theorem 6.6. Let P = { ~ ~11 ~ i ~ t, 1 ~ j ~ t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric name- 
stamp rotocol. Then P has a receiver-verification sequence if and only if for every two 
users X and Y and each i ~ 2, at least one of the foUowing conditions holds: 
(a) a , (X ,  Y )  ~ (E  u I)*; 
(b) cti(X,Y)=wlw2 where w le (Eu I ) *  and w2e({Dx}u Ju{d})  + and 
fli-,(X, Y) = w2'z for some z e r* ;  
(c) ai(X, Y)=WlW3W4 where w l~(Eu I ) * ,  w3~({Dx}u Ju{d})  +, and w4~ 
({Dx} u J u {d})*, and also/3H(X, Y) = w;lTfor some 3" e ({Dy} w J w {d})*, and 
N2i-3(X, Y )= 7-1w31z. Further, either 
(d) wae(Jw{d}) ÷, or 
(e) w3 = ,~2DxS~ with 81 e (J~.,{d})*, and either 
(i) 
(ii) 
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wl = woEx821 for some Woe (E u I)* or 
wl=woWs ivith Woe({Ey}uI)* and ws~{Ex}({Ex}uI)*w{1} and 
ExB21 = w6ws for some w6 ~ ({Ex} w I)*. 
Proof. Corollary 6.3 and Lemma 6.5 show that if P has a receiver-verification 
sequence, then for each i, either (a) or (b) or (c) holds. Thus, it remains to show 
that these conditions imply the existence of a receiver-verification sequence. To do 
this we simply describe the appropriate ui_l and v~-i and let the reader check that 
these choices yield the desired results. Thus, for each i ~ 2, define ui_l and v~_~ as 
follows: 
at,(X, Y)fl,_~(X, Y) 
w l w3 T 
Ui_ 1 := 
WoS~ 7
if case (a) or case (b) holds, 
if case (c)-(d) holds, 
if case (c)-(e)(i) holds, 
if case (c)-(e)(ii) holds; 
fW6Wo 1 if case (e)-(e)(ii) holds, 
l~i-1 1 
t 1 otherwise. [] 
Suppose that P has a receiver-verification sequence. Does this imply that P is 
receiver-verifiable ? Unfortunately the answer is not always 'yes'. Consider the various 
conditions given in Theorem 6.6. If for some i~ >2, case (c)-(e)(ii) occurs with 
woe 1, then it is not necessarily the ease that P is receiver-verifiable since the 
corresponding vi-1 will not necessarily be left-invertible. Thus, in this one case we 
have the situation that being a strong receiver-verification sequence depends on the 
form of Wo. In all other situations, the fact that vi-i = I means that vi_~ is left-invertible 
so that the sequence is strong. 
The situation for sender-verifiability is parallel to that of receiver-verifiability. 
There is a sequence of results that parallel Lemmas 6.2-6.5 that yield Theorem 6.7 
below, and the above interpretation of Theorem 6.6 in terms of a strong sequence 
has a parallel interpretation for strong sender-verification sequences. 
Theorem 6.7. Let P = {Jr s ~ [ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~ j <<- t'} be a two-party nonsymmetric name- 
stamp rotocol. Then P has a sender-verification" sequence if and only if for every two 
users X and Y and each j >>- 1, one of the following conditions holds: 
(a) ,Sj(X, Y )e  (E w I)*; 
(b) [3j(X,Y)mWlW2 where w l~(EwI )*  and w2~({Dv}wJu{d})  +, and 
aj(X, Y) = w21z for some z~ F*; 
(c) flj(X, Y)=wlw3w4 where Wl~(EwI)* ,  ws~({Dy}u Ju{d})  +, and w4~ 
({Dg}uJu{d})* ,  and also aj(X, Y)= w417 for some y~({Dx}u Ju{d})* ,  and 
"N2~_2( X, Y)= ~/-l w~l z. Further, either 
(d) ws~(Yu{d})  +, or 
(e) ws = BzDv81 with B~ ~ (J U {d})*, and either 
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(i) wl = woEs521 for some Woe (E u I)*, or 
(ii) wl = WoW5 with Woe ({Ex}u I)* and 
Ey6-~ 1= w6w5 for some w6e ({Ey} u I)*. 
Wse{Ey}({Ey}u I)*u{1} and 
Notice that each of these conditions can be checked in linear time. Further, from 
the proof of Theorem 6.6 we see that if one knows that a receiver-verification 
sequence xists for protocol P, then one can construct such a sequence in linear 
time. A similar statement holds for sender-verification sequences. 
7. Verification sequences for symmetric name-stamp rotocols 
Finally we consider symmetric name-stamp protocols. This is the most general 
case of protocols in the model developed by Dolev and Yao. 
Assume a fixed two-party symmetric name-stamp protocol P = 
{t~,/3j[ 1~< i ~< t, 1 <~j <~ t'} and two arbitrary users X and Y. We begin by developing 
some properties of P. 
Definition 7.1. An irreducible word u=dAv iae( Ju{d}) (DuE)* I  is called 
blocking. 
The notion of blocking word used here is different from that used in Section 6. 
Notice that if u is blocking, then w~uw2= w~uw2 for all w~, w2e F*. 
Lemma 7.2. (a) No ai(X, Y) contains a blocking factor. 
(b) No flj(X, Y) contains a blocking factor. 
ProoL We only prove (a), the proof of (b) being similar. Assume that ai(X, Y) = 
w~ uw2 where u = dAVia is a blocking factor. Then 
N2,_~(X, Y) = ai(X, Y)N2,-2(X, Y) 
= wluw2N2,-2(X, Y) = wluw2N2i-2(X, Y) 
- w dAui w2N2,_2(X, Y)  
so that lt(N2i-l(X, Y)) n ( Ju  {d}) ~ ~, a contradiction. [] 
From Lemma 7.2 we have the following facts. 
Corollary 7.3. (a) For each i >~ 2, ai(X, Y) e (E u {Dx} u I)*(E u {Dx} u J u {d})*. 
(b) For each j >~ 1, gj(X, Y) e (E u {Dy} U I)*(E u {Dy} u J u {d})*. 
(c) al(X, Y )e (Eu{Dx}u I)*. 
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) immediately follow from Lemma 7.2. Further, N~(X, Y) = 
a~(X, Y)eF*  and lt(Nl(X, Y) )n ( Ju{d})=t~ so that a le (Eu{Dx}u I ) * .  [] 
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Corollary 7A. (a) For each i ~ 2, if a~(X, Y) = WldAW2, then w2 ~ (E ~ {Dx} 
J u  {d})* and N2~_2(X, Y) has prefix w~IiA. 
(b) For each j>~l, if flj(X, Y)=w~dAW2, then w2e(Eu{Dy}u Ju{d})*  and 
N~j_~(X, Y) has prefix w2:iA. 
Proof. Let ai(X, Y) = WldAW2. By Corollary 7.3(a), w:¢ (E u {Dx}u Ju  {d})* so 
that w2 has a right-inverse, w2 ~. If Nz~-2(X, Y) does not have w2~iA as prefix, then 
N2,_~(X, Y) = a,(X, Y)N:,_2(X, Y)=w~d~w:N2,_2(X, Y) 
= w, dAw2N2,_~(X, Y) 
since dAw2 is not totally cancelled. Hence, It(N2H(X, Y)) n (J  u {d}) # 0, a contra- 
diction. 
Thus, (a) is true, and (b) is proved similarly. [] 
Lemma 7.5. (a) For some i >- 2, suppose that ai( X, Y)= wlw2 and ~i_l ( X, Y)= Wa W4, 
where Wl ~ (E w {Dx} u I)*, w2 = 1 or w2 ~ (J u {d})(E u {Dx} u J u {d})*, Wa = 1 or 
w3e(Eu{Dy}u I)*I, and w4e(Eu{Dy}u Ju{d})* .  Then w21 is a prefix Of Wa, 
or w31 is a suffix of w2. 
(b) For some j>~l, suppose that flj(X, Y)=wlw2 and aj(X, Y)= WaW4, where 
Wl ~ (E u {Dy} u I)*, w2 = 1 or w2 ~ (J u {d})(E u {D~,} u J u {d})*, w3 = 1 or w3 
(E u{Dx}u I)*I, and w4e (E u{Dx}u Ju{d}) .  Then w-~ 1is a prefix Of wa, or w31 
is a suff i  of w2. 
Proof. We only prove (a), the proof of (b) being similar. 
--1 Assume that w2 is not a prefix of Wa and w31 is not a suffix of w2, so that w2 # 1 
and w3 # 1. This means that w2 = dAU for some u ~ ( E u { Dx} u J u {d})* and w3 = rib 
for some v e ( E u { Dy} u I)*. From the assumption, w2w3 = dAuoia = dA-~ia  with 
uv # 1 or  daia # 1. Thus, as(X, Y) f lH(X,  Y) = WldAUViaw4 = wldAuvi~w4 contains a 
blocking factor and, hence, so does 
• N2,_,(X, Y)=a, (X ,  Y)g,_t(X, Y)N2,-a(X, Y)= WldA-~isw4N2,-s(X, Y)
which implies that N2H(X,  Y) ~ (E u D u I)*, a contradiction. [] 
Lemma 7.5 shows that for all i~>2 and all j~>l, ai(X, Y)~i-1(X, Y) and 
/3j(X, Y)aj(X, Y) are in (EuDuI ) * (EuDuJu{d})*  so that each such word 
has a factorization as uv where u ¢ (E u D u I)* is left-invertible and v is right- 
invertible. Further, for each i~>2, N2i:l(X, Y)= wlw3 where ai(X, Y)f lH(X,  Y )= 
wlw2 and N2i_s(X,Y)=w21ws, and, for j~>2, N2j(X,Y)=w4w6, where 
~j(X, Y)aj(X, Y) = W4Ws and N2j-2(X, Y) = w51w6 • Now this is true for every two- 
party symmetric name-stamp rotocol P. We use these facts in considering 
verification sequences. 
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Theorem 7.6. Let P = { ~, ~11 <~ i <~ t, 1 <-j <~ t'} be a two-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol and let X and Y be any two users. Then P has a receiver-verification sequence 
if and only if the following conditions hold: 
For each i>~2, let a~(X, Y)~8~_~(X, Y )= w~w~, N~_3(X, Y)= w~w3, and 
N2~_I( X, Y) = w~ w~ where w2 is right-invertible. Let z be the longest common suOix of 
w~ and w~ ~. Then either 
(a) w~ =f~f2z and w-~ ~ = g~z where f~, g~ ~ (D  to {Ey} ~ 1)* and f2 ~ F*,  or 
(b) w~ =f~z and w~ ~ = g~g2z where f~, g~ ~ (D  to {Ey} to I)* and g2e F*.  
That is, w~ = f l f2z and w-~ = g~g2z where f~, g~ e ( Dto { Ey} to I)*, f~, g~ e F*,  and 
either f~ = 1 or g~ = 1. 
ProoL First we show that the condition is sufficient. For each i, define uH,  v~_~  F*  
as follows: 
~f2g-[ ~ i f  w~ = f~f2z and w~ ~ = g~z, 
ui_~ := i.g~_ ~ if Wl =f~z and w~ ~ = glg~z; 
~f~-~ if w~ =f~f~z and w~ -~ = glz, 
vi-~ := [gzf~_ 1 if w~ =f~z and w~ -~ = g~g2z, 
where f~, gl ~ (D u {Ey} u I)* and f2, g2 e F* .  Now it is straightforward to check 
cases and determine that u~_~ N2i_3( X, Y )= vH N2~_~( X, Y). 
To prove that the condition is necessary, assume that {(uH, v~-~)}[=2 is a receiver- 
verification sequence and let i~2 .  Let w=ot~(X, Y)~_~(X,  Y)  so that WeFxFy  
and N2~_~(X, Y) = wN2i-3(X, Y). Hence, there exist w~, w2, w3 e F* with w2 being 
right-invertible such that w = w~w2, N2~-3(X, Y)  = w-~Wa, and N2~-I(X, Y) = WlW3. 
I n  particular, we have w2 ~ (E to {Dx} to J to {d})*(E to {Dy} to J to {d})* and so 
w~ -1 e (D to {Ey} to I ) * (D  u {Ex} to I)*, and wl, w3 ~ (E to D to I)*, since they are 
factors of N2i-l(X, Y).  Further, uHN2~_3(X, Y )= v~-IN2H(X, Y),  so that 
uHw-~w3 = v~_~w~w3. Finally, let z denote the longest common suffix of w~ and 
w~ ~. Clearly, w~ can be factored as wl =f~f2z for some f~ ~ (D  to {Ey}to I)* and 
f2e{Ex}F*  or f2 = 1, and w~ -~ can be factored as w~=g~g2z for some g~e 
(D to {Ey} to I)* and g2 e {Ex}F* or g2 = 1. What must be proven is that f2 e F*  and 
g2 = 1 or that f2 = 1 and g2 e F*.  
Case 1. Assume that f2 # 1 and g2 # 1. Then f2 = Exfa and g2 = Exg3 for some 
f~, ga e F*. This gives 
ui-l N2~-3( X, Y)  - ui_l w-~lw3 = ui_lglg2zw3 = ui_lglExg3zw3 
= uHglExg3Zw3 
since Dx ~ l t (uH).  Also, 
t~i-I Wl W3 = Vi- l f lAZW3 = v i - l f lEx f3~3 -'- ~Exf3gw3 
since Dx ~ lt(vi_l). Hence, u~_ig~Exg3zw3 = vHf~Exf3zw3. 
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If IExg3l ~ IExf3l, then the equality stated above implies that Exf3 is a nonempty 
suffix of Exg3. Thus, Exf3z is a suffix of Wl (since w~ =flExf3z) as well as of w2 ~ 
(since w2 ~ = g~Exg3Z) with IExf3zl > Izl contradicting the choice of z. 
If I Exg31 <lExf3t, a corresponding contradiction is reached. 
Thus, we have f2 = 1 or g2 = 1. 
Case 2. Now suppose that f2 ~ F*.  This implies that f2 ~ 1 and so by Case 1 we 
see that g2 = 1; thus, w2 t= g~z. Now f2~ F*y implies that f2 = Exf3Dxf4 for some 
f3 C F*  and f ,  ~ F*. This means that 
and 
Ui-- 1N2 i_3(X ,  Y)  = ui-~ w21 W3 = Ui-lglZW3 
Vi'lN2i-,(X, Y )= vi-,flf2zw3 = vi- , f lExf3Dxf,  zw3 = v,-lflExf3Dxfazw3 
since Dx~lt(v~_l). Hence, Ui_lglzw3 = vi-lflExf3Dxf4zw3. The words uH,  glzw3, 
and vi_ l~Exf3Dxzw 3 are irreducible. Therefore, there exist 3'1, 3'2, 3'3 ~ F* with 3'2 
being right-invertible and satisfying ui_~ = 3'13'2, glZW3 = 3'2 ~ 73, and 
vi-lf lExfaDxf4zw3 = 3'13"3- Since u~_l e F*y we have 3"1, 3'2e F*.  Now Dx ~ lt(yl) 
implies that 13"31>>- IDxf4zw3[, i.e., 3'3 = 74Dxf4zw 3 for some 3'4~F*. Thus, glzw3 = 
--1 3"2 3'3 ---- 3'213"4Dxf4zw3, implying gl 3" 213" 4Dxf  4. Since w21 = glz, this yields w~ l = 
3'~3',DxAz. But wl =f l f2z =flExf3Dxf4z and so Dxf4z is a common suffix of wt 
and w2 ~ with IDxf4zl > Izl, contradicting the choice of z. Hence, f2e F* .  
The assumption that g21~ F*y yields the same contradiction in an analogous 
manner. 
Thus, we have f2, g2 ~ F*y with at least one being the identity. This concludes the 
proof of the necessity of the condition. [] 
We state without proof  the parallel result for sender-verification sequences. 
Theorem 7.7. Let P = { ai, flj [ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~ j <~ t'} be a two-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol and let X and Y be any two users. Then P has a sender-verification sequence 
if and only if the following conditions hold: 
For each j~ l ,  let ~j(X, Y)a j (X,  Y)=wlw2,  N2j-2(X, Y)=w-~lw3, and 
N2j( X, Y )= wlw3 where w2 is right-invertible. Let z be the longest common sufftx of 
wl and w21. Then either 
(a) W 1 =flf2z and w-~ 1 = g l  z with fl, gl 6 (Du  {Ex}U I)* and f2~ F* ,  or 
(b) Wl =f lz  and w21 = glg2z with fb  gl ~ (Du {Ex}u I)* and g2~ F*.  
That is, wl = flfeZ and w21 = gtg2z where f~, gl ~ (D w {Ex} u I)*, f2, g2 ~ F*,  and 
either f2 = 1 or g2 = 1. 
Again we must consider the question of when the existence of a receiver- 
verification sequence implies the existence of a strong receiver-verification sequence. 
For a two-party symmetric name-stamp protocol P and receiver Y, this means that 
for every/, 2 <~ i <~ t, vi-1 is in ({Dy) u E u 1)*. Using the same type of 'brute force' 
combinatorics as in the proof  of Theorem 7.6, one can prove the following fact. 
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Theorem 7.8. Let P = { ab ~j [ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~ j <~ t'} be a two-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol and let X and Y be any two users. Then P has a strong receiver-verification 
sequence {(ui-1, vH)}[~-2 i f  and only if thefoUowing conditions hold: 
For each i>~2, let ai(X,  ~r)~i_l(X, Y )= wlw2, N2i-3(X, Y )= w21w3, and 
~I2H(X, Y) = wl w3 where w2 is right-invertible. Let z be the longest common suffix of  
w l and w21, let w l = f l f 2 z where f l  = 1 or f l  ~ F* . {Dx} and f2 ~ F*,  and let w ~ ~ = g ~ g2 z 
where gl ~ (D  u {Ey} u I)* and g2 = 1 or g2 ~ {Ex}(E u D u I)*. Then either 
(a) g2 = 1 and f~(Du{Ey})* ,  or 
(b) A,A  (ou{Ey})* and g2E(Eu{Ov}u I)*. 
Notice that the factofizations of w~ and w2 ~ as given in Theorem 7.8 differ from 
those given in Theorem 7.6. 
A similar result holds for protocols with strong receiver-verification sequences. 
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